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Abstract 
This article examines the tensions within the international drug control system which are 
putting the until now consensual position in regard to the prohibition on drugs supply and use 
for anything other than medical and scientific use – the Vienna Consensus - under strain. The 
article examines a number of areas where policy stress is leading to controversy about potential 
violation of international drug control treaty obligations by States parties. Drawing a 
comparison with earlier periods of stress when drug control fell under the League of Nations, 
it suggests that what appears to be occurring is a shift in the Vienna consensus, and that the 
drug conventions are sufficiently flexible to permit resulting shifts in practice, although reform 




The current international drug control system was built under the auspices of the United 
Nations, and is centred institutionally in Vienna. Vienna is the location for the annual convening 
of the UN’s Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the UN’s principal specialist policy organ 
on drug control, and for the sessions of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the 
expert technical committee which monitors global drug control. It is also the home of the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which provides administrative facilitation for the 
system.1 At the heart of the system is apparent consensus about drug prohibition except for 
medical and scientific purposes. Expressed through the provisions of the drug conventions, it 
is reflected institutionally in the usually consensus based decision making processes within the 
CND.2  This support for a single position on drug control stands in stark contrast to the highly 
conflictual situation that developed within the League of Nations international drug control fora 
in the pre-War period. The commodity control agreements3 which formed the basis of League 
control had been under significant stress in the period up to 1941 because of controversy over 
regulated drug markets in territories in Asia under colonial control producing surpluses that fed 
into, in particular, demand in the United States.4 The League’s drug control system foundered 
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during World War II. The principle of international control was not, however, rejected. Harry 
Anslinger, long serving US Commissioner of Narcotics (from 1931) and US representative on 
the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee and then on the UN’s Commission of 
Narcotic Drugs (CND), believed that under the UN system ‘world cooperation [embraced the] 
entire group of civilized nations’ under ‘American leadership’.5  The League’s powers were 
transferred to the United Nations in the Lake Success Protocol in 1946.6 The 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs,7  its 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs,8 and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances9 introduced a more 
tightly girdled structure for global drug supply that limited both supply and use to medical and 
scientific purposes (although at the time advocates of even stricter drug control within the US 
administration such as Anslinger thought the 1961 Convention too flexible leading to their 
resisting its adoption10). A more fully-developed law enforcement apparatus to suppress 
organized supply of drugs for illicit purposes was adopted in the 1988 United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.11 These 
international treaties were the culmination of a ‘long game’12 for the United States that had 
begun in 1909 with attempts to stop the opium trade into China at the Shanghai Opium 
Commission.13  
During the period of United Nations stewardship of the drug control system 
considerable efforts have been undertaken both at the international and national levels to 
institutionalise and implement the promises that States parties have made in these conventions. 
Remarkably, most States have stayed in step with global drug prohibition. It has been argued 
that ‘soft defection’ through measures ameliorating the impact of these laws on users has 
occurred14 but the drug conventions have in fact proved flexible enough in their language to 
permit such ‘defection’ to occur within the ambit of the promises made by State parties because 
the convention are not as prescriptive as more ardent prohibitionists would have liked. 
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Provisions safeguarding State party discretion in implementation are, for example, common.15 
Recently, however, more challenging notes of dissonance have begun to be heard from States. 
Given the existence of these tensions and the upcoming United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on drugs in 2016 which provides an official opportunity for some reassessment 
of the system of international drug control by States,16 it is timely to ask whether, and if so why, 
States have begun ‘Waltzing on Vienna’.  
There are many areas of policy tension within the evolving global drug control system, 
but only a few have led to reference to the provisions of the drug conventions and to claims of 
transgression of the objectives of the system. This piece begins in part 2 by examining a clear 
signifier of tension in the system: renewed interest in the object and purpose of the system. With 
a view to a general comment on their systemic and broader impacts, part 3 briefly examines a 
number of these topical areas of tension within the global illicit drug control system, 
summarising the policy battles and their effect on the legal rules. The areas examined (in rough 
chronological in order to give some sense of the historical growth of discord in the system) are 
State flexibility on personal use, harm reduction, human rights issues, Bolivia’s denunciation 
and re-ratification with reservation in regard to coca leaves, and the introduction of legal use 
and legal markets for cannabis within certain States. Part 4 then engages in an assessment of 
the general systemic impact of the system of these tensions.  
 
 
2. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
SYSTEM 
The objectives of the international drug control system took some time to settle.  As noted 
above, the League period saw a struggle between States like Britain, which sought only official 
control of supply but without limitation of use, and the United States, which sought limitation 
of supply only for these exclusive uses, a struggle won by the United States. Following Vienna 
Convention17 orthodoxies a textual analysis of the current drug conventions reveals that their 
common objectives are to specifically limit ‘the production, manufacture, export, import, 
distribution of, trade in, use and possession of’ the drugs scheduled under the treaties ‘to 
medical and scientific purposes’18 and to ‘suppress’ other illicit activities.19 These objectives 
are entwined; the principle that certain activities are to be exclusively lawful dictates that other 
activities are not and those are the activities to be suppressed. At the Diplomatic Conference 
that settled the 1961 Single Convention, the British Representative, Mr. Green, the first speaker 
at the negotiations, noted 
 
                                                          
15 See, for example art 36(1)(a) and art 36(4) of the 1961 Convention, art 22(1)(a) of the 1971 
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the policy debates at the two previous UNGASS meetings in 1998 and 1998 see Martin 
Jelsma, UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on 
Drug Policy (Washington: Brookings, 2016), 5 et seq. 
17 Art 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.  
18 Preambular para 8 and art 4(c), 1961 Convention; preambular para 5 and art 5(2) 1972 
Convention.  
19 Preambular paras 5, 10 and 13, and art 2 of the 1988 Convention.  
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that narcotics control had two aspects: The limitation of production to legitimate purposes 
and the prevention of the illicit traffic. The object was to eliminate abuses without hindering 
the use of narcotics for therapeutic purposes or impeding scientific progress. 20 
 
The preamble of the 1961 Single Convention reminds us that it is designed to provide for 
‘continuous international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and 
objectives’.21 The system thus requires sustained adherence to these objectives of limitation and 
elimination. While the drug conventions do permit discretion to States parties in certain areas 
such as treatment of users they do no permit the same degree of latitude in regard to control of 
the supply of drugs.  
Until recently most States parties have concentrated upon suppression as a technical 
problem and there has been little interest in exploring the drug control system’s ultimate 
purposes. Recent pressure for change exerted by civil society has refocused attention on the 
system’s purpose. Lines, drawing on the preambles of the drug conventions, notes that this 
purpose is to attain its objectives for the benefit of the ‘health and welfare of mankind’,22 and 
this view is shared by the UN General Assembly in 2014.23 Whether the objectives of limitation 
to medical and scientific purpose and suppression of the illicit activities have or ever will 
achieve the health and welfare of mankind is, however, increasingly disputed.24 Critics argue 
that the system operates on the undemonstrated assumption that suppressing supply and demand 
will achieve positive health and welfare outcomes and that even on its own terms it has failed 
to suppress these activities.25 The following areas of tension in the international drug control 




3. AREAS OF TENSION IN THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Flexibility on Personal Use 
Signs of a more flexible position being taken by States in regard to the objective of elimination 
of abuse of proscribed drugs first appeared in the modulation of their approaches to personal 
use offences. The UN Drug Conventions do not oblige States parties to criminalise use per se; 
instead possession for personal use functions as a proxy offence to achieve this purpose. Article 
36(1) of the 1961 Single Convention had limited the obligation on States parties to establish the 
possession of drugs for personal use as a ‘punishable offence’. The 1961 Convention and the 
1971 Convention were silent on the purposes of possession which allowed States parties to 
develop different positions on possession. The flexible interpretation adopted by some States 
                                                          
20 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Official 
Records, Volume I (New York, 1964) UN Doc. E/CONF.34/24; UN Publication Sales No. 
63.XI.4., p4. 
21 Preambular para 8. 
22 Preambular para 1 of the 1961, 1971 and 1988 Conventions. See Richard M. Lines, The Fifth 
Stage of International Drug Control: International law, Dynamic Interpretation and Human 
rights (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Middlesex University, 2014), 176-181 [permission]; see also 
Damon Barrett and Manfred Nowak, ‘The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards a Human 
Rights Based Approach’ in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of 
International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kallipi K. Koufa (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff), 
449, 461. 
23 GA Resolution 69/201, 18 December 2014, preambular para 6. 
24 See generally, Bewley-Taylor (n 10), 11. 
25 Barrett and Nowak (n 22), 461. 
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that the obligation was limited to possession for supply purposes was reflected in the UN’s 
Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.26 Pressure in the negotiation of the 
1988 Convention on supply-side states to take responsibility for interdicting drug flows led 
Mexico to attempt to re-balance the burden of obligations in the Convention onto demand-side 
States by establishing an unambiguous obligation to establish possession for personal 
consumption as an offence.27 Article 3(2) requires States parties  
 
to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its 
domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for personal consumption, contrary to the 
provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 
Convention. 
 
However, even here, as a result of the lack of consensus about using criminalization the text 
contains a safeguard clause subjecting the obligation to the ‘constitutional principles and the 
basic principles of [the party’s] legal system’.  If these options for not criminalising are not 
available, the express terms ‘to establish as a criminal offence’ present a clear obligation. The 
UN’s Commentary on the 1988 Convention, however, recognises that the provisions for 
treatment and rehabilitation in article 3(4)(d) as an alternative to punishment affords States 
parties some latitude in regard to how to execute the obligation in article 3(2).28  
In the 1960s and 1970s states within the United States were the first to begin to reduce 
the penalties for cannabis use, then began stopping prosecuting cannabis personal use offences 
as a matter of policy, and finally decriminalised entirely.29 In Europe, the Netherlands 
decriminalised personal use in 1976.30 In the late 1980s states in Australia began to 
decriminalise by applying administrative penalties.31 The causes of relaxation varied from the 
negative human rights implications of criminalisation to more prudential use of public and in 
particular law enforcement resources.  
These modulations have not usually constituted direct challenges to the objectives of 
the drug conventions. Spain (1992)32and Italy (1990),33 for example, adopted a system of 
administrative penalties for possession of all drugs which arguably conform to the conventions. 
                                                          
26 Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, (New York: UN, 1973), UN 
Publication Sales No. E.73.XI.1., 112. 
27 See United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Official Records, Volume II (New York, 1991) UN 
Doc. E/CONF.82/16/Add.1, 53. 
28 See Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (New York, 1998) UN Doc. E/CN.7/590; UN Publication 
Sales No.E.98.XI.5., 81, par 3.94. 
29 Oregon was the first state to change its law, with the Oregon Decriminalization Bill of 1973. 
For a review of cannabis prohibition in the US see Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. 
Whitebread, II, ‘The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the American 
Legal History of Marijuana Prohibition’ (1970) 56 Virginia Law Review 971-1169. 
30 Opiumwet, Staatsblad 1976: 424. See Sebastian Scheerer, ‘The New Dutch and German Drug 
Laws: Social and Political Conditions for Criminalization and Decriminalization’ (1978) 12 
Law and Society Review 585, 587. 
31 In 1987 South Australia introduced a Cannabis expiation Notice (CEN) policy. See Wayne 
Hall, ‘The Recent Australian Debate about Prohibition of Cannabis Use’ (1997) 92 Addiction 
1109. 
32 Organic Law 1/1992 of 21 February 1992. 
33 Presidential Decree 309 of 9 October 1990. 
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Portugal when explaining its partial abandonment of criminalisation of personal use offences 
in 199934 maintained it adhered to the 1988 Convention’s obligation to establish a domestic law 
prohibition on these activities.35 The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which took 
upon itself the task of maintaining the integrity of the system, was quick to ‘remind’ States of 
their obligation under article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention.36 State practice like Portugal’s, 
however, indicated increasing use of the inbuilt capacity for flexible interpretation of article 
3(2)’s obligation ‘to establish as a criminal offence’, if only in limited cases. In 2004 the INCB 
conceded that ‘the practice of exempting small quantities of drugs from criminal prosecution is 
consistent with the international drug control treaties’, but continued to emphasise that the 
objectives of the conventions were to limit abuse.37 In 2009, utilising the safeguard clause to 
article 3(2), Mexico passed a law providing that possession of small amounts of heroin, opium, 
cannabis and cocaine would no longer lead to criminal prosecution.38 The INCB in 2009 in its 
Annual Report reminded Mexico of its article 3(2) obligations,39 but Mexico has not changed 
its practice. The aforementioned examples illustrate legislative/executive use of the safeguard 
clause but the domestic courts have also used this clause. In 2009 the Argentine Supreme Court 
declared criminalisation of possession for personal consumption in private places a 
constitutional breach because it interferes with the right to personal autonomy.40  
Faced with this wave of reforms in regard to personal use in 2009 the INCB responded 
generally that it was concerned about political support for the movement to decriminalize 
possession among high profile politicians and noted that the movement posed a ‘threat to the 
coherence and effectiveness’ of the system, sent the ‘wrong message to the general public’, and 
unless ‘resolutely countered’ would undermine drug control.41 
 
 
3.2 Harm Reduction 
Harm reduction measures such as drug maintenance and substitution programmes, needle and 
syringe exchanges, drug consumption rooms, and so forth, present another challenge to the 
system.42 While they are designed to reduce attendant harm of use such as infection, they have 
been characterised by antagonists inter alia as aiding and abetting in the abuse of drugs.43 Their 
                                                          
34 Law 30 of 2000. Possession of drugs for personal consumption, in amounts higher than the 
ones needed for 10 daily doses, remained a criminal offence. 
35 See Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes and Alex Stevens, ‘What can We Learn for the Portuguese 
Decriminalization of Drugs?’ (2010) 50 British Journal of Criminology 999, 1002 et seq. 
36 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001, UN Doc. E/INCB, 
2001/1 (New York: United Nations, 2002), 74, para 509. 
37 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2004, UN Doc. E/INCB, 
2004/1 (New York: United Nations, 2005), 80, para 538. 
38 Decree of 20 August 2009, amending art 478 of the General Health Act.  
39 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2009, UN Doc E/INCB/2009/1, 68, 
para 408. 
40 Arriola Ruling, Case No A 891 XLVI Supreme Court of Justice, Argentina, 25 August 2009.  
41 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2009, UN Doc. E/INCB, 
2009/1 (New York: United Nations, 2010), 75, para 453. 
42 See generally Bewley-Taylor (n 10), 102 et seq. 
43 See Joanne Csete and Jonathan Cohen, ‘Human Rights Abuses faced by Injection Drugs 
Users in the Era of HIV/AIDS’, in Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch and Sarah Gallagher (eds), 
The War on Drugs, HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (New York: International Debate Education 
Association, 2004), 212, 217.  
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legality can be defended through reference to the narrow interpretive scope44 that flows from 
the absence of a constraining definition of ‘medical and scientific purposes’ and provision in 
the conventions for States parties at their discretion to offer measures of treatment, education, 
aftercare, rehabilitation, and social integration as alternatives or additions to criminal 
penalties.45 Under the UN Political Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Demand Reduction 
Control adopted at the 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug 
Problem, States committed to offer ‘the full spectrum of services, including reducing the 
adverse health and social consequences of drug abuse for the individual and for the society as 
a whole’.46 Yet the UN’s drug control organs in Vienna and in particular the CND have been 
the forum for an ongoing political rather than legal conflict about the use of ‘harm reduction’, 
placing them out of step with other UN organisations involved with public health where its use 
is commonplace.47 In 2002 the UNDCP legal section opined that there was sufficient flexibility 
in the drug conventions to accommodate harm reduction.48 Yet the term is not used at all, for 
example, in the 2014 report of the INCB.49  
 The conflict over the legality of drug injection rooms provides a concrete example of 
the harm reduction debate. These safe facilities for drug use are provided lawfully in Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain and Norway. In spite of 
recognition by the WHO of ‘compelling evidence’ that they reduce HIV infections in a cost 
effective manner,50 in 2000 the INCB noted that establishing drug injection rooms ‘is contrary 
to the international drug control treaties’51 and in 2004 stated ‘they are against the central 
principle embodied in the drug control treaties, namely that the use of drugs should be limited 
to medical and scientific purposes only.’52 Proponents argued that these rooms are lawful so 
long as they did not permit sale, acquisition or passing on of drugs, are genuinely risk reducing, 
and subject to adequate control.53 They noted that the drug conventions are silent on whether 
these rooms constitute a legitimate practice of social reintegration and rehabilitation, that state 
practice is unclear, and therefore argued the matter is for States parties.54 Finally, they pointed 
to the protection of fundamental human rights. In 2008 the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
held in PHS Community Service v Attorney General of Canada55 that access to the INSITE 
injecting facility in Vancouver was guaranteed by the right to life under section 7 of the 
                                                          
44 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN Doc A/65/255, 6 August 2010, 16; 
Dave Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma,  The UN Drug control Conventions: The Limits of 
Latitude, TNI/IDPC Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, no.18, March 2012, 9. 
45 Art 36(1)(b) of the 1961 Convention, art 22(1)(b) of the 1971 Convention and art 3(4)(d) of 
the 1988 Convention. 
46 UN Doc. A/Res/S20/4, 10 June 1998. 
47 Bewley-Taylor (n 10), 132-4.  
48 Decision 74/10, Flexibility of Treaty Provisions as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches, 
prepared by UNDCP ’s Legal Affairs Section, E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5, 30 September 2002, 
49 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2014, UN Doc. E/INCB, 
2014/1 (New York: United Nations, 2015). 
50 WHO, Effectiveness of sterile needle and syringe programming in reducing HIV/AIDs among 
injecting drug users (Geneva, 2004), 28. 
51 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 (n 36), 74, para 510. 
52 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2004 (n 37), 77, para 510. 
53 Dr Körner, Chief Public Prosecutor Frankfurt-am-Main, Report on the Admissibility of Health 
Care Centres for Hygienic and Stress-free Consumption by Opiate Addicts, Frankfurt, 1996. 
54 The Swiss Institute of International And Comparative Law, AVIS 99-121c, Use of Narcotic 
Drugs in Public Injection Rooms under Public International Law, 7 January 2000. 
55 2008 BCSC 661. 
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was not overridden by international drug control 
treaties, a decision upheld on appeal both to the British Columbia Court of Appeal in PHS 
Community Services v Canada (Attorney General)56 and to the Supreme Court in Canada 
(Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society.57 The INCB responded in 2011 that 
‘the provisions of internal law cannot be invoked to justify non-compliance with provisions of 
the international drug control treaties to which a State has become a party’.58 However, by 2014 
it had ameliorated its position, simply reiterating ‘its concern that such facilities could be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the international drug conventions.’59 The INCB’s position 
only indicates that it thinks that the system is threatened by harm reduction; it does not speak 
for all States parties in this regard. There is probably sufficient flexibility within the system to 
accommodate harm reduction because as it is aimed at amelioration of conditions affecting the 
health and welfare of users of drugs it does not constitute a direct challenge to the central 
provisions in the conventions that limit the supply of drugs to medical and scientific purposes.  
 
3.3 Human Rights Problems 
In addition to harm reduction failures, the human rights failures of the international drug control 
system are legion. The object of limitation limits access of the vast majority of people to 
moderate or severe pain relief and more generally restricts access to medicines because of 
potential diversion to the illicit trade. The object of elimination impacts disproportionately on 
black people in North America and Europe, drug-crop eradication produces collateral costs to 
health and the local economy in agricultural drug-producing States, and the use of large-scale 
violence in operations against drug cartels, police brutality against individual suspects in 
custody, detention without trial for the purpose of treatment of drug users, and the employment 
of the death penalty against drug traffickers all have negative human rights impacts.60 These 
shortcomings result from the negligible reference to human rights in the development and 
administration of the drug conventions,61 the result of an absence of consensus at the time on 
either inclusion of human rights control or a human rights mandate to the drug control bodies. 
Recent rhetorical commitment to carrying out the commitments in the conventions ‘in full 
conformity’ with international human rights instruments is usually finely balanced with 
reference to state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.62  
It is a matter of concern, however, that the drugs conventions and the drug control 
institutions have an indirect but influential relationship with human rights abuses; while they 
do not prescribe them, they do structure the system that employs them at a national level. This 
relationship of influence is well illustrated by the controversy that surrounds the application of 
the death penalty to drug supply convictions. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health, Anand Grover has recorded, 32 jurisdictions currently apply capital punishment to drug 
offences, some mandatorily.63 Under article 36(1) of the 1961 Single Convention states parties 
promise that ‘serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by 
                                                          
56 2010 BCCA 15. 
57 2011 SCC 44. 
58 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2011 (New York: UN, 2012), 
239, para 289. 
59 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2014 (n 49), 54, para 362. 
60 Barrett and Nowak (n 22), 451-454; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, UN Doc 
A/65/255, 6 August 2010, 10-14. 
61 Barrett and Nowak (n 22), 449. 
62 See, for example, operative para 2 of GA resolution 69/201 of 18 December 2014.     
63 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, UN Doc A/65/255, 6 August 2010, 8. 
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imprisonment or deprivation of liberty’, although the 1961 Commentary notes that they are 
entitled to adopt stricter measures including the death penalty.64 The 1988 Convention, like 
most crime suppression conventions neither provides for nor rules out the possible application 
by a State party of the death penalty. Human rights bodies have, however, criticised executions 
for drug offences as violations of international law.65  The 1988 Convention provisions are not 
entirely standard free; article 3(4)(a) obliges States Parties to make article 3(1) trafficking 
offences ‘liable to sanctions which take into account the grave nature of these offences, such as 
imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation.’ 
In 2007, the Indonesian Constitutional Court, in Sianturi and ors v Indonesia,66 rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the imposition of capital punishment on Indonesian and Australian 
drug traffickers under Indonesia’s Narcotics Law No 22 of 1997, by reference to the 1988 
Convention. The Court considered that the imposition of death was appropriate because the 
Indonesian drug trafficking offences implementing the 1988 Convention was a valid exception 
to the prohibition on interference with the right to life in article 6 of the ICCPR under paragraph 
(2), which did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for the ‘most serious’ crimes. 
Rejecting the opinion of the UN Human Rights Committee that drug trafficking offences were 
not among the ‘most serious crimes’,67 the Court considered there to be no substantial difference 
between them and ‘most serious crimes’ like genocide because they also affected the 
‘economic, cultural and political foundations of society’ and carried ‘danger of incalculable 
gravity’.68 There is little analogous content between core international crimes involving proof 
of intentional killing and injury, and drug supply offences resting on a presumption of intent to 
traffic based on volume of the drug carried. Drug supply covers a wide range of conduct from 
the trivial to the serious, something recognised by the Convention itself through the application 
of aggravating factors that are by definition not present in every case.69 The Indonesian position 
continues to cause serious tensions with States whose nationals are executed for committing 
this offence.70 The UNODC Executive Director has noted that the weight of opinion is that 
these offences do not reach the threshold of most serious crimes and has advocated its 
abolition.71 The INCB has also moved on this issue, and now encourages States ‘to consider 
                                                          
64 1961 Commentary (n 26), 449-450. 
65 Concluding Observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/84/THA, 8 July 2005, para 14, and Report of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, UN Doc A/50/40, 3 October 1995, para 449.  
66 Constitucional Review, Nos 2, 3/PUU-V/2007; ILDC 1041 (ID 2007), 23 October 2007. 
67 UN Doc A/HRC/4/20, para 53. 
68 Ibid, para 3.24. 
69 Through art 3(5). See Rick Lines, ‘The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: What do the 
international drug control treaties say about ‘most serious crimes’, University of Essex Human 
Rights Centre Blogs, 29 May 2015, <http://blogs.essex.ac.uk/hrc/2015/05/29/the-death-penalty-
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70 In April 2015 Australia withdrew its Ambassador because of the execution of two of its 
nationals for drug trafficking by Indonesia – NBC News, ‘Bali Nine: Australia pulls 
Ambassador from Indonesia after Execution’, 29 April 2015, available at 
<http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/bali-nine-australia-pulls-ambassador-indonesia-after-
execution-n34996>. 
71 UNODC, Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: A Human Rights 
Perspective, Note by the Executive Director, UN Doc E/CN.7/2010/CRP.6*–
E/CN.15/2010/CRP.1, 3 March 2010, paras 25 and 26. 
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abolishing the death penalty for such offences’.72 At the 2015 meeting of the UN Commission 
of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice the European Union called for the consideration of 
the abolition of the death penalty for drug offences although the United States noted that the 
mandate of the INCB did not extend to instructing states on this issue.73 
The Vienna consensus is considered a hurdle to progress on human rights because it 
mutes criticism of State practices that violate human rights.74 It stands in marked contrast to the 
strong mutual criticism of State practices by participants in debates within the League’s Opium 
Advisory Committee.75 That criticism was, however, directed at failures to enforce limitation, 
not at violation of rights through limitation or enforcement.  
 
3.4 Bolivia’s Repudiation and Re-ratification with a Reservation of the 1961 Convention 
The 1961 Single Convention is in part a response to concerns in the developed world that its 
problems with the non-medical use of narcotics are fuelled by the traditional cultivation of the 
plants from which these drugs are derived.76 Coca leaf chewing is endemic in Bolivia both as a 
cultural practice of indigenous people and as a relief for altitude sickness.77 There is a conflict 
between the cultural right of indigenous peoples to enjoy this cultural custom and the 
obligations under the 1961 Convention.78 In terms of article  2(6) coca leaf is subject to all the 
measures of control in the convention, as well as to specific measures in articles 26 (regulation 
of cultivation through a national agency and taking possession of crop) and 27 (cultivation for 
use as a flavouring agent).  In terms of article 49(1) a State party could make a temporary 
reservation in regard to the chewing of coca leaves but in terms of article 49(2)(e) coca leaf 
chewing had to be abolished within 25 years of the Convention coming into force. It came into 
force in 1964 and therefore the obligation to abolish coca leaf chewing became absolute in 1989 
for those States parties that made the reservation; for other non-reserving State parties coca leaf 
was subject to control in 1964.  
Bolivia, a party since acceding on 23 September 1976, had not made such a reservation 
and was thus under the obligation to implement control of coca leaf from accession but had 
never actually implemented this prohibition, maintaining the legality of the practice under its 
domestic law,79 a fact commented on by the INCB.80 Bolivia attempted to formalise its position 
of non-implementation after adopting a new constitution in 2009 that recognised ‘the rights of 
indigenous peoples to their cultural identity, spirituality, practices and customs’81 and protected 
coca in its natural state as ‘cultural patrimony’.82 Citing this conflict with indigenous peoples’ 
rights (by implication with the provisions of the convention) and arguing there was no conflict 
with the health objects and purposes of the Convention in doing so, Bolivia sought to change 
                                                          
72 Lochan Naidoo, President of the INCB, in INCB, Report of the International Narcotics 
Control Board for 2014, iii.  
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297-8. 
78 Ibid., 295 et seq. 
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80 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 (n 36), 57, para 368. 
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its commitments under the Convention by seeking international support to delete article 49.83 
The Convention provides in article 47 that if a proposed amendment has not been rejected by 
any party within an 18 month it automatically comes into force; if there are objections ECOSOC 
must decide if a conference of the parties is necessary to consider the amendment. Twenty one 
States parties did raise objections to the proposal, while only 18 mainly Latin American States 
supported it.84  The United States, for example, objected as follows: 
 
Through ratification of the Single Convention, member states undertake an obligation 
to limit the trade and use of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. 
Member states also recognise measures against the abuse of narcotic drugs require co-
ordinated and universal action. Schedule I to the Single Convention lists coca leaf as a 
narcotic drug. In considering the proposed amendment, Member States must remain 
guided by the principles and objectives of the Single Convention. In accordance with 
Article 47, paragraph 1(b), of the Single Convention, the mission informs the United 
Nations that the United States of America, consistent with its general obligations 
outlined in Article 4 of the Convention, does not accept the proposed amendment.85 
 
Ironically it is questionable whether amendment of article 49 would have achieved Bolivia’s 
goal as coca leaf would have remained in Schedule 1 and subject to all the provisions in the 
Convention.  
However, the objections halted further progress and Bolivia did not wait for ECOSOC 
to decide whether a conference was necessary to clarify matters. It switched tactics and 
denounced the Convention on 29 June 2011 by notification to the UN Secretary General, with 
its withdrawal taking effect from 1 January 2012.86 It then re-acceded but with the following 
reservation:  
 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia reserves the rights to allow in its territory: traditional 
coca leaf chewing; the consumption and use of the coca leaf in its natural state of cultural 
and medicinal purposes, such as its use in infusions; and also the cultivation, trade and 
the possession of the coca leaf to the extent necessary for these licit purposes. At the 
same time, the Plurinational State of Bolivia will continue to take all necessary measures 
to prevent its abuse and the illicit production of narcotic drugs which may be extracted 
from the leaf.87 
 
Under article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation must not be 
‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.’  The legal arguments marshalled for 
acceptance of Bolivia’s withdrawal, re-accession and reservation include allowing a State like 
Bolivia with specific objections to a particular provision to remain in the system of control, 
                                                          
83 Letter Dated 12 March 2009 From the President of Bolivia Addressed to the Secretary 
General, UN Doc E/2009/78 enclosure, 15 May 2009, 4.  
84 See Pfeiffer (n 77), 301-2. 
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while simultaneously conveying the intensity of its objection to the other parties.88 The authors 
of the 1961 Commentary considered a strategy of this kind entirely legal under article 50(3) of 
the Single Convention, which permits other reservations, stating that ‘a party may reserve the 
right to permit the non-medical uses as provided in article 49, paragraph 1, of the drugs 
mentioned therein, but also non-medical use of other drugs, without being subject to time limits 
provided for in article 49.’89 However, article 50(3) provides that if one third or more States 
parties (which put the threshold for Bolivia at 61) objected within one year, the strategy would 
be defeated. By the end of the period only 15 States parties had objected, a weight of objection 
insufficient to meet the threshold to block the measure. The objecting States parties as Pfeiffer 
notes were mainly concerned about ‘the legal implications of the reservation for the 
international drug control regime and for the international law of treaties more generally.’90 
Japan objected that the reservation ‘seems to be in conflict with the object and purpose of the 
1961 Convention to prevent the illicit production, manufacture and trafficking of cocaine’.91 
Russia worried that ‘[t]his step also establish a dangerous precedent and might be used by other 
states in order to establish in their territories more liberal drug control machines that are 
provided for by the’ drug conventions.92 Sweden ‘had serious concerns regarding the 
procedure’ followed by Bolivia noting that ‘[s]uch practice would constitute a misuse of the 
procedure and would undermine the basis of international treaty and the International legal 
framework for the fight against drugs.’93 The INCB noted Bolivia’ step with regret and 
continued:  
 
The Board is concerned that, while that course of action is technically permitted under 
the Convention, it is contrary to the fundamental object and spirit of the Convention. If 
the international community were to adopt an approach whereby States parties would 
use the mechanism of denunciation and re-accession with reservations to overcome 
problems in the implementation of certain treaty provisions, the integrity of the 
international drug control system would be undermined.94 
 
Bolivia’s re-accession came into force on the 10 February 2013.  
The impact of this process on the general international law of treaties is beyond the 
scope of this article. However, in the context of international drug control the implication is that 
the system yielded when pushed hard in novel ways on a single issue. Bolivia had not pursued 
a process of the interpretation of the conflicting legal obligations but instead forced the drug 
control obligations to give way not for medical but sociocultural reasons.95 The ending of 
exceptions for the cultivation of specific narcotic producing plants was considered by the 1961 
Commentary to be one of the signal achievements of the Single Convention when contrasted 
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with the earlier League treaties.96 Unsurprisingly this ‘reform by subtraction’ has been touted 
as useful as a tool for wider reform of the system.97 From a voluntarist point of view Bolivia’s 
action seem entirely permissible within public international law; its utility as a tool for general 
reform of the system would require wholesale engagement in similar actions by other States 
parties, a clumsy and for that reason unlikely prospect. Of more immediate practical import 
however, is that a measure considered symbolically important in the chain of illicit supply has 
been rolled back by one State party. 
 
3.5 The (Re)Introduction of Legal Cannabis Production and Use in Certain States Parties 
The harmfulness of cannabis, coupled with widespread use and enforcement action against that 
use, has made it something of stalking horse for both the proponents and antagonists of reform 
of the drug control system. States began to test the system when, as described above, they 
decriminalised personal use offences. The establishment of what is effectively legal use and 
supply of cannabis for non-medicinal personal consumption has ratcheted up the challenge to 
the limitation and elimination objectives of the international drug control system. 
The Netherlands has led the way in this regard with its ‘coffee shop’ system. It claims 
adherence to article 36(1) of the 1961 Convention and article 3 of the 1988 Convention through 
its Opium Act,98 justifying its inaction in prosecutorial guidelines99 that rely on the principle of 
expediency, which gives the prosecution the discretion not to prosecute if it is in the public 
interest. The prosecution of offences involving  retail sale of up to 5gm to individual customers 
and the storage of 500gm for this purpose has been given the ‘lowest judicial priority’.100 The 
Netherlands considers the expediency principle’s application in this context to be one of its 
‘basic legal concepts’ protected in the proviso to article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention. The 
difficulty is the supply of cannabis through the ‘back door’ into the coffee shops. Legal 
tolerance of quantities for commercial trading by the shops themselves is not subject to article 
3(2)’s proviso but falls under the unqualified obligation under article 3(1). Article 3(6) of the 
1988 Convention obliges the States parties to ‘endeavour’ to ensure that ‘discretionary legal 
powers’ are ‘exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures’. The 
Netherlands, however, made a reservation to article 3(6) that it accepted it only to the extent 
that it accorded with ‘Dutch criminal legislation and Dutch policy on criminal matters.’101  The 
INCB has repeatedly condemned this system102 but in its latest report was silent, as the Dutch 
have been joined by other more extravagant dissenters.   
 Although it had long ceased to penalize possession of small amounts of drugs including 
cannabis, in 2014 Uruguay legislated to permit the cultivation of up to six cannabis plants as 
well as the formation and registration of cannabis growing clubs.103 But these were exceptions 
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to a step which echoes the State controlled monopolies of the League era: Uruguay 
institutionalised State control of the chain of supply of the drug through the Institute for 
Regulation and Control of Cannabis, permitting individuals of 18 years and older to buy up to 
40 grams of cannabis from this state monopoly per month. Uruguay acknowledges that there 
its position is contentious and acknowledges that the drug control conventions may require 
revision and modernisation, but defends its position by referring to human rights protections 
and by claiming that its policies accord with the original purposes of the drug control treaties, 
protection of the health and welfare of mankind.104 State controlled sale is yet to take place, but 
private growing has gone ahead.  
 Perhaps the most interesting defection, or more kindly, realignment of interests, has 
occurred in the United States, as it comes to terms with the heavy load that policing and 
punishing trivial drug offences has placed on its criminal justice infrastructure. When Alaska 
on grounds of protection of privacy decriminalized possession of four ounces of cannabis in 
state law through decisions of its courts,105 a tension emerged between legality at the state level 
and illegality at federal level. This tension ratcheted up when beginning with California in 1996, 
a number of US states introduced limited exemptions for the supply of cannabis for medical 
purposes.106 The US federal authorities had initially continued to prosecute violations by 
medical cannabis growers of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) but announced in 2009 that 
it was adopting a ‘Non Enforcement Policy’ to the effect it would stop enforcing the federal 
laws against individuals that comply with state medical marijuana laws.107 In 2010 the INCB 
noted that it was ‘deeply concerned about [the] “medical”  cannabis schemes’  that had been 
introduced in a number of US states and complained that the ‘control measures applied in those 
states to the cultivation of cannabis plants and the production, distribution and use of cannabis 
fall short of the control requirements of the 1961 Convention’ .108 Its complaint was directed at 
non-compliance with article 28 of the 1961 Convention, which requires the establishment of a 
national cannabis agency to which all growers must deliver their crops, if a State party is going 
to permit the cultivation of cannabis. However, the INCB also felt that the medical utility of 
cannabis was unproven (a technical classification which the INCB itself is not mandated to 
make). The INCB applauded the United States Government for stating that it was opposed to 
the legalization of cannabis and would continue to enforce federal law against cannabis 
cultivation and supply, which the INCB took as ‘confirming the Board’s position that federal 
law supersedes state law with regard to the obligations contained in the international drug 
control conventions.’109  
The INCB was not, however, able to prevent the unfolding of a more significant 
challenge to the international drug control system originating within the United States. 
Beginning in 2011, state laws have been enacted permitting state regulation and taxation of the 
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cannabis market initially in Colorado110 and Washington111 (although they have since been 
joined by others).  The US federal authorities responded with a 2013 Memorandum from the 
Justice Department, which reaffirmed that cannabis was a dangerous drug and illegal supply a 
serious crime.112 It set enforcement priorities as prevention of sale to minors, the generation of 
revenue by enterprises, gangs and cartels, diversion to states where it remains illegal, preventing 
authorised activities from being used as a cover for trafficking in other illegal drugs or illegal 
activities, violence and the use of firearms in the production of cannabis, drugged driving and 
other adverse public health consequences, growing on public lands, and growing on federal 
property.113 Noting that it had because of resource limitations usually left enforcement activities 
that did not fall within these priorities to local and state authorities, its expectations are that 
these authorities will provide ‘strong regulatory and enforcement systems that will address the 
threat that those state laws pose to public safety, public health and other law enforcement 
interests.’114 It will only step in and challenge these state laws if state regulation is ineffective 
and federal enforcement priorities are threatened.115 It clarifies that large scale or for-profit 
motive of a cannabis operation can no longer by themselves serve as a proxy for the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. Importantly, the memorandum is subject to the proviso that it serves 
‘solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion’ and ‘does not 
alter the Department’s authority to enforce federal law, including federal laws relating to 
marijuana, regardless of state law’.116 The policy does not explicitly approve the creation of 
cannabis markets within states; it makes it clear that the operation of these markets where they 
contravene its prosecution priorities will be a Federal priority, but where they do not they will 
not be a priority.117 If the reforms work, however, the implication is that cannabis supply will 
be left unprosecuted in a number of US states, which it has been argued places the United States 
in contravention of its treaty obligations.118 The Memorandum itself does not address the United 
States’ obligations under the drug conventions. However, its formal position is that it is not 
violating these conventions because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis remain 
criminal offences under Federal drug law in the form of the CSA.119 A further leg to this 
argument appears to be that it believes the treaty provisions permit a ‘substantial discretion’ 
regarding where to allocate its law enforcement resources and recognise the limitations placed 
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on compliance by a State party’s constitution.120 The INCB has responded negatively, pointing 
out that the 1961 Convention limited cannabis to medical and scientific purposes, that the 
legislation of cannabis in the two states in question ‘was not in conformity with the international 
drug control treaties’ and urged ‘the Government of the United States to continue to ensure the 
full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory.’121 
 Does an executive decision not to enforce the law against particular activities 
(cultivation and supply in its various forms) of a particular drug (cannabis) in a particular place 
(Washington, Colorado) contravene a party’s (the United States) international obligations? 
Clearly taking action against all contraventions of all drug laws is not required. While confusing 
as a matter of constitutional law,122  the United States position does not appear to be legally 
tenable as a matter of international law. McNair, writing in 1961 noted the general principle: 
 
The division of powers in Federal States between the Federal Government and the 
Governments of the States or Provinces give rise to special problems. Normally the 
treaty-making capacity resides in the Federal government, while the legislative power 
is divided between the Federal government and the Government of the States and 
Provinces. The principle is clear that if the Federal Government concludes a valid treaty 
it is responsible for seeing that it is performed.123 
 
A federal state cannot justify its failure to perform a treaty obligation because of any special 
features of its constitutional system unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself.124 The 
question is whether the drug conventions provide for an exception to the general rule.125 
 A candidate is provision for prosecutorial discretion in the conventions. The right to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion in regard to that criminalisation is recognised in article 36(4) 
of the 1961 Single Convention (substantially repeated in article 3(11) of the 1988 Convention), 
which provides that ‘[n]othing contained in this article shall affect that principle that the 
offences to which it refers shall be defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with the 
domestic law of a Party.’ This provision, a savings provision of a kind commonly inserted in 
penal law treaties, indicates among other things that the execution of enforcement is a matter 
for the Parties.126 It is a copy of article 15 of the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the 
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Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs,127 which was interpreted at the time of signature as meaning 
that the parties have a discretion to take into account ‘mitigating circumstances’.128  If nothing 
else, this implies that discretion is retained but on a case by case basis and the authors of the 
1936 Convention did not conceive of it as permitting a blanket decision not to prosecute based 
on internal law. The United States authorities do enjoy a broad prosecutorial discretion.129 They 
may also point the Netherlands reliance on expediency as precedent. It is probably untenable to 
argue that formal guidance as to discretion is always impermissible, but Krajewski’s view that 
this discretion should be applied with circumspection and only to minor offences or it would 
otherwise undermine the system is more plausible in the light of the history of pressure on States 
by other states to make the prohibition system effective.130 Moreover, it is state law which 
precedes and which de facto dictates Federal prosecution policy in this case. The United States 
riposte may be that they it is not exercising its discretion in a blanket fashion but rather it is 
choosing not to prosecute certain cases due to limited resources made even more limited by the 
fact that it can no longer rely on state authorities to assist (using the mirror provisions of the 
CSA contained until recently in state law). The Cole Memorandum explicitly says that if there 
is a strong federal interest nothing in the policy will prevent prosecution even where none of 
the priorities are present.131 Nonetheless, this decision involves a large number of cases in a 
specific place in regard to a specific substance, some of which may be regarded as serious using 
the government’s own yardstick of quantity of substance supplied; it is far more than the 
exercise of discretion in a particular case. Furthermore, the discretion argument ignores the fact 
that the duty to criminalise supply offences under article 3(1) of the 1988 Convention is subject 
to article 3(6) which obliges them to endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers 
are used to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement and with due regard to the need to 
deter these offences. The current federal policy cannot be said to be an endeavour to deter the 
sale of cannabis in Colorado and Washington. The Federal authorities may respond that it has 
enabled the suppression of trafficking in other drugs through reallocation of resources, but they 
would be more convincing if they were engaging in selective prosecutions within these States 
of large scale cannabis supply operations. 
It also appears untenable to rely on the broader safeguard clauses such as the provision 
in article 2(1) of the 1988 Convention that States parties must carry out the obligations in the 
convention ‘in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective domestic 
legislative systems’ or the more specific provision in article 36(1) of the 1961 Convention that 
subjects its criminalisation obligation to the party’s ‘constitutional limitations’ justifies a 
blanket decision not to prosecute in this way.  Safeguard clauses of this kind are not blanket get 
–outs for non-performance of specific obligations unless the domestic law prevents compliance 
with the particular obligation. As the Canadian delegate who introduced the provisos in article 
36(1)(a) and (b) noted, they were included because ‘it was useless to impose on countries 
obligations which they could not meet without changing their legal system’.132 The US federal 
authorities are not constitutionally or legally prevented from prosecuting the cultivation and 
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supply of cannabis within Colorado and Washington, they are choosing not to do so as a matter 
of policy.  
The Cole Memorandum de facto if not de jure concedes the existence of a jurisdiction 
within Colorado and Washington to effectively regulate cannabis markets. Together, the state 
law and the decision not to prosecute if the state law works can arguably be taken to result in 
non-compliance with provisions in the drug conventions such as article 4 of the 1961 
Convention’s unqualified duty ‘to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the 
production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs’. 
AS noted, it for the State party to ensure that the Convention applies in all of its federated 
components.  The INCB anticipated this controversy when it stated in 2011:  
 
281. The international drug control treaties must be implemented by States parties, 
including States with federal structures, regardless of their internal legislation, on their 
entire territory. While all States have different legal systems and legal traditions, the 
Board wishes to remind the States parties of the basic principles of international law 
enshrined in the provisions of articles 27 (on the irrelevance of internal law) and 29 (on 
the application of the treaty on the entire territory of the party) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.133 
 
The INCB has not asked the United States to explain what provisions of its constitution or 
domestic law prevent it from complying, although arguably it may do so.134  
Whatismore, the non-prosecution of the banking of the proceeds of the cannabis markets 
in the states where it has been established almost certainly violates the obligation on the United 
States to criminalise money laundering in article 3(1)(b) and (c) of the 1988 Convention and in 
article 6 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime by both enacting an 
appropriate law (which has been done) and by enforcing that law. 135  
 The alternative view is that if these acts continue to be established as a criminal offence 
in the entirety of US territory the drug convention obligations are met, because the safeguard 
clauses permit such flexibility and they are being interpreted in this way by States parties in 
their practice without complaint by others (as yet). The US’s taking of this view exposes a 
contradiction between the US’s post-war rhetorical commitment to supply control and its own 
practice. It appears to be intent on sticking with the existing treaties, fostering flexible 
interpretation to suit changing conditions, tolerating different national strategies and countering 
transnational criminal networks.136 In 2014 President Obama said: 
 
The U.N. drug conventions, which recognize that the suppression of international drug 
trafficking demands urgent attention and the highest priority, allow sovereign nations 
the flexibility to develop and adapt new policies and programs in keeping with their 
own national circumstances while retaining their focus on achieving the conventions’ 
aim of ensuring the availability of controlled substances for medical and scientific 
                                                          
133 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2011 (n 58), 38, para 281. 
134  See 1961 Records vol. 2 (n 132), 243, where the Legal Advisor notes that the ‘organ 
supervising the execution of the Convention would be entitled to inquire what provisions of 
their constitution or domestic law prevented them from complying.’ 
135 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for 
signature 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, in force 29 September 2003. The US ratified 
the Convention on 3 November 2005.  
136 Bennet and Walsh (n 117), 8, citing remarks made by William Brownfield, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at a Debate at the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies in 2014. 
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purposes, preventing abuse and addiction, and suppressing drug trafficking and related 
criminal activities.137 
 
This leaves the drug control system as a functioning system. Yet there is nothing like a tu 
quoque accusation to undermine claims by the United States that another State party is 
breaching its promises. It may be that the US will be accused of undermining the international 
drug control system by States with growing internal drug use problems of their own who appear 
to be stronger disciples of the drug war than the originator of this term.   
 
 
4. WALTZING, DICORDANCE, OR A NEW TUNE? 
 
The prohibitionist nature of international drug control has been accepted in an uncontested way 
since drug control fell under UN auspices. Although practice has not been uniform everywhere, 
a majority of States parties have opted for an at least rhetorical (if not actual) commitment to a 
predominantly law enforcement approach. This essentially political approach is not always 
reflected in the nature of the conventions, in particular the 1961 and 1971 conventions, which 
do permit a degree of flexibility on specific issues of criminalization. However, the political 
norms that structure international drug control are the production of continuous human effort 
within the practice of States. When some States through their practice begin to challenge these 
objectives of the system, they can destabilise what many assume to be immovable. First in 
regard to use, and more recently in regard to supply, the practice of some States has moved 
some distance from the objectives of the strict prohibitive position of limitation of the supply 
and use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes and elimination of others forms of supply 
and use. It has occasioned repetitive condemnation in the INCB.138 This condemnation has, 
however, begun to sound increasingly weary because it is the States parties themselves that 
guard the Vienna consensus, and that consensus is under pressure.  
There are credible arguments that the current system does not meet the overall health 
and welfare purposes of the conventions. So what does the future hold? One cannot be sanguine 
about making predictions of major reform of the drug control system; there is too much 
institutional inertia and too many States have bought heavily into the current approach as the 
only possible way of controlling their domestic drug problems. On the other hand the major 
proponent of the current system, the United States, which lost control of the opium question to 
the League in 1920, regained it in 1946, appears now to be loosening its grip, and of being 
forced by internal pressure into becoming a reluctant proponent of flexible interpretation.  
Although rhetorically committed to the drug conventions as frameworks for the effort to 
suppress the international drug traffic,139 the US’s present ambivalent policy is likely to have 
an effect on the rigidity of the system as a whole.  
One possibility for further change is modification of obligations in respect of certain 
substances (cannabis is the most likely candidate) amongst like-minded groups of States parties 
to the conventions, relying on article 41 of the Vienna Convention.140 Other States parties more 
committed to absolute prohibition may object to a proposed variation of this kind on the basis 
of incompatibility with the object and purpose of the drug conventions. If the variation makes 
                                                          
137 ‘Presidential Determination—Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries 
for Fiscal Year 2015’, 15 September 2014, cited in Bennet and Wells (n 117),  10. 
138 See Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma (n 88), 32-41. 
139 Presidential Determination no. 2014-15 of September 15, 2014, ‘Presidential Determination 
on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2015,’ 79 Fed. 
Reg. 56625 (22 September 2014), at 55626. 
140 See Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma (n 88), 66. 
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it past this hurdle the crunch may come if there is an increased flow of controlled substances 
from the States Parties that have modified their obligations into other States Parties that have 
not, giving the latter a material basis for objecting that the modification is affecting their 
enjoyment of their rights under the treaties or adding to their legal and social burdens. The 
emerging multispeed drug control system would begin to display friction between its different 
parts.  It would be more principled to align the conventions accurately with the actual criminal 
laws being enforced against individuals, if only out of respect for the principle of legality. 
Ideally, States should heed the calls for attempted reform of the system as a whole141 and 
regenerate consensus in Vienna, but of a different kind. 
 
                                                          
141 See, for example, Bennet and Walsh (n 117), 3. 
